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AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 




This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses the effectiveness of 
corporate governance and implications for policy.  Most corporate governance research focuses on a 
universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. board structure, shareholder activism) and 
performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse 
environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices.  In contrast to such 
‘closed systems’ approaches, we propose a framework based on ‘open systems’ approaches to 
organizations which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies, 
and complementarities of different corporate governance practices.  These three sets of organizational 
factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organizational 
environments.  We also explore how costs, contingencies, and complementarities impact effectiveness of 
different governance aspects through the use of stylized cases and discuss the implications for different 
approaches to policy such as ‘soft-law’ or ‘hard law’.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance relates to the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake 
in the firm (Aoki 2001).  Effective corporate governance employs mechanisms to ensure executives 
respect the rights and interests of company stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders 
accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth 
invested in the firm.  Such effectiveness may be based on a number of different dimensions of corporate 
governance, ranging from monitoring and control over managerial discretion to promoting entrepreneurial 
leadership and innovation.  Underpinning corporate governance are also various policy approaches that 
aim to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance by regulating managerial power (Parkinson 
1993; Davis 2005).   
Most of the empirical literature on corporate governance has attempted to understand corporate 
governance in terms of agency theory and explored links between different corporate governance 
practices and firm performance.  This literature is motivated by the assumption that, by managing the 
principal-agency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and 
perform better. This ‘closed system’ approach found within agency theory posits a universal set of 
linkages between corporate governance practices and performance and devotes little attention to the 
distinct contexts in which firms are embedded.  Despite considerable research effort, the empirical 
findings on this causal link have been mixed and inconclusive.  For example, empirical studies of the 
effects of board composition and ownership structure on financial performance have failed to identify any 
consistently significant effects (Ketchen et al. 1997; Dalton et al. 2003; Deutsch 2005).  Critiques of 
agency theory have pointed out its ‘under-contextualized’ nature and hence its inability to accurately 
compare and explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different institutional 
contexts (Aguilera and Jackson 2003).  Similarly, much of the resulting policy prescriptions enshrined in 
codes of ‘good’ corporate governance rely on universal notions of ‘best practice,’ which often need to be 
adapted to the local contexts of firms or ‘translated’ across diverse national institutional settings (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Fiss and Zajac 2004; Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005).  As Thompson (1967, 
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p.4) noted, ‘[Since] much of the literature about organizations has been generated as a by-product of the 
search for improved efficiency or performance, it is not surprising that it employs closed-systems 
assumptions.’ 
By contrast, the literature in organizational sociology has largely advocated an ‘open systems’ 
perspective, which suggests that different corporate governance practices may be more or less effective 
depending upon the contexts of different organizational environments (Thompson 1967; Scott 2003).   
Within the field of corporate governance, stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) comes closer to an ‘open 
systems’ approach by recognizing that the effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends on a  
wider set of firm-related actors.  Stakeholder theory shifts attention from efficiency arguments (e.g. 
narrow definitions of performance) toward a broader understanding of effectiveness in terms of goal 
attainment in relation to the multiple objectives of different constituent stakeholders (Connolly et al. 
1980).  Other approaches, such as resource dependence (Pfefffer and Salancik 1978) and comparative 
institutional theory (Aoki 2001), have also focused growing attention on how corporate governance 
relates to different organizational environments.  While we draw upon these theories, we argue that the 
study of corporate governance needs to move to an ‘open systems’ logic of studying organizations which 
gives greater attention to the broader environmental context.  Surprisingly, very little corporate 
governance research has built on the large and robust body of organizational sociology which explicitly 
examines the alignment between organizations and their broader environment (Thompson 1967).  In this 
paper, we aim to close this theoretical gap. 
We propose an organizational sociology approach to comparative corporate governance which 
will better account for the interdependencies of corporate governance practices within diverse technical, 
managerial, and institutional environments.  Our conceptual framework suggests that the corporate 
governance problems outlined by the agency and stakeholder perspectives must be challenged better in 
order to capture the patterned variation in corporate governance that results from interdependencies 
between firms and their environment.  Thompson (1967) argues that the focus on universal aspects of 
organizations is necessary, but leads ultimately to a static conceptualization of organizations.  As he 
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(1967, vii) suggests, ‘to get leverage on a topic, we must begin to see some of the universal elements as 
capable of variation.’  Along these lines, recent studies of corporate governance have attempted to explain 
the dynamic dimensions of corporate governance over the company life cycle (Johnson 1997; Filatotchev 
and Wright 2005), as well as the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across countries and 
over time (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Gospel and Pendleton 2005). Thus, an important task in corporate 
governance research is to uncover the diversity of arrangements and to understand how the effectiveness 
of governance practices is mediated by their fit or alignment with situational variables (’context’) arising 
in diverse organizational environments.  
The ‘open systems’ perspective from organizational sociology suggests viewing corporate 
governance in terms of its effectiveness or the degree of goal attainment of key constituents of the firm.  
In the context of corporate governance, effectiveness in the broadest sense involves the accountability of 
corporate decision-makers and the legitimacy of decisions with regard to their different economic and 
non-economic goals and values.  However, since multiple stakeholder constituents are likely to have 
different goals and objectives, effectiveness tends to be a complex and multidimensional construct that 
often defies single measures (Connolly et al. 1980).1  Thus, our aim is not to advocate a particular 
definition or measure of effectiveness, but to highlight how our framework may be useful for studying 
different aspects of effectiveness in relation to corporate governance.  Throughout the paper, we utilize 
examples of effective governance concerned not just with the protection of investors’ wealth, as in agency 
theory, but also the creation of new wealth and the distribution of wealth among stakeholders.  This 
context-specific view of effectiveness contrasts sharply with agency theorists, who argue that different 
elements collapse into a single long-term organizational objective and that accountability is impossible 
without a singularity of objectives (Jensen 2001). 
We propose a novel conceptual framework for understanding the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices. We see it as being mediated by interdependencies between organizations and their 
                                                 
1
 The relationship between effectiveness and efficiency is complex, because (1) sometimes efficiency leads to 
effectiveness and (2) sometimes organizations achieve their goals effectively but fail to achieve maximum efficiency 
in some dimension.   
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environments, which we conceptualize in terms of three constructs: costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities.  Costs refer to the value of inputs to corporate governance, such as compliance with 
existing regulations or opportunity costs of managing relations with institutional investors.  These costs 
will vary for different firms operating in different sorts of environments, so that cost-benefit analyses are 
rarely universal.  Contingencies refer to how corporate governance interrelates with variations in firms' 
internal and external strategic resources that shape its interdependence with market, sectoral, regulatory, 
or institutional environments. For example, older firms in the mature phases of their business life-cycle 
may have a deeper and more diversified resource pool and thus a greater demand for accountability to 
external stakeholders than younger firms in their start-up phase, which may have narrower resource bases 
and thus higher focus on internal, capability-related aspects of governance.  Complementarities refer to 
the overall ‘bundles’ of corporate governance practices that are aligned with one another and mutually 
enhance the ability of those practices to achieve effective corporate governance.  For example, the 
effectiveness of independent board members depends upon the presence of other complementary factors, 
such as high shareholder involvement and strong legal protection for investors.  Although the notions of 
contingencies and complementarities may be interrelated, it is useful to separate them as two independent 
theoretical constructs.  Contingencies in our framework impact the effectiveness of a particular corporate 
governance practice, ceteris paribus, whereas complementarities describe interactions among multiple 
corporate governance practices notwithstanding the firm’s contingencies.  
Even though these three constructs may not comprehensively account for the complexity of 
interdependence between organizations and their environments, we believe that costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities are useful conceptual tools to analyze why effective corporate governance can be 
reached through different paths and non-linear trajectories.  Our main contribution is to demonstrate how 
corporate governance research, largely based in agency theory, can be enriched by drawing more 
systematically on key traditions in organizational sociology.  Both research fields are concerned with 
diverse organizational environments, but corporate governance research tends to pay less attention on 
how the governance factors affect the adaptation of organizations to those different environments.  Our 
 6 
approach also contributes to an emerging literature on comparative corporate governance, more 
specifically to the micro-foundations of this literature, by focusing on the level of organizations, rather 
than broader national systems with diverse institutional legacies and traditions.  For example, Schmidt et 
al. (2002) and Schmidt and Spindler (2004) analyze potential complementarities between various 
elements of national governance systems, and we develop this framework further by focusing on 
complementarities between governance practices at the organizational level. Recent comparative work 
stresses the potential for organizational diversity within national systems, so that institutions may support 
certain types of organizations at the expense of others (Williamson 1991; Aoki et al. 2007).  The benefit 
of a contextual- and organizational-level view of corporate governance is a better understanding of 
organizational effectiveness resulting from the coincidence and interaction among multiple factors (Davis 
and Marquis 2005).2  This view is consistent with recent ‘set theoretic’ approaches to studying 
organizational practices (Fiss forthcoming) that focus on equifinality, whereby different initial conditions 
lead to similar effects or multiple conjunctural causation (Ragin 2000; Kogut et al. 2004).  In short, our 
framework helps explain why no ‘one best way’ exists to achieve effective corporate governance.  Rather, 
corporate governance arrangements are diverse, but exhibit patterned variation across firms and their 
environments. 
Grounding corporate governance in organizational sociology has important implications for 
future research and policy analysis.  First, the framework can be applied to the study of governance 
processes in diverse forms of organization, such as entrepreneurial firms or multinational firms, which 
have often been overlooked in the corporate governance literature.  Second, similarities and differences in 
corporate governance can also be more systematically compared within and across industries, as well as 
in broader sets of national institutions and regulation.  Third, our framework can help explain how 
different policy approaches based in ‘hard law,’ such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or ‘soft law,’ such as 
the UK Combined Code, impact different types of firms.   
                                                 
2
 This approach stresses the study of cases as complex and interdependent ‘wholes,’ rather than isolated 
characteristics where the marginal impact of particular variables may be studied under the presence of statistical 
control factors or assumptions of ‘all things being equal.’  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  First, we develop a critique of existing corporate 
governance literature, which is based on universalistic approaches to understanding the effectiveness of 
corporate governance, and we argue for greater attention to the patterned variation in corporate 
governance drawing on organizational sociology theory.  Second, we propose a particular approach to 
looking at the organizational aspects of corporate governance based on the costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities of corporate governance in different types of organizational environments.  Our 
framework is not based on a typology of such environments, but rather presents a set of constructs to 
capture the interdependencies between corporate governance and its environment that draws upon classic 
approaches in organizational sociology (e.g. Thompson 1967).  Third, we explore the interactions among 
costs, contingencies, and complementarities by applying our framework to several stylized examples 
drawn from the corporate governance literature.  Fourth, we apply our framework to assess the 
effectiveness of public policy approaches to corporate governance based on how these impact the costs, 
contingencies, and complementarities associated with governance.   
FROM UNIVERSALISM TO DIVERSE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS  
Much of corporate governance research is based on a universal model outlined by principal-agent theory 
(Fama 1983; Jensen 1986). The central premise of this framework is that shareholders and managers have 
different access to firm-specific information, and managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can 
engage in self-serving behavior that may be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth maximization.  This 
stream of research identifies situations in which shareholders’ and managers’ interests are likely to 
diverge and proposes mechanisms that can mitigate managers’ self-serving behavior. As Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p. 703) elaborated in their survey article, “corporate governance deals with the agency 
problem: the separation of management and finance. The fundamental question of corporate governance 
is how to assure financiers that they get a return on their financial investment.”  A substantial body of 
literature is based on this straightforward premise and suggests that, to constrain managerial opportunism, 
shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance mechanisms, including monitoring by 
boards of directors and mutual monitoring by managers (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rediker and Seth, 
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1995) as well as monitoring by large outside shareholders (Holderness and Sheehan 1988). In addition, 
internal governance mechanisms may include various equity-based managerial incentives that align the 
interests of agents and principals (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Finally, external factors, such as the threat 
of takeover (Manne 1965; Jensen and Ruback 1983), product competition (Hart 1983; Jensen 1993), and 
managerial labor markets (Fama 1980) may constrain managerial opportunism.  These governance 
practices are considered effective to the extent that they reduce agency costs and are hypothesized to result 
in positive efficiency outcomes and better firm financial performance.  In sum, agency theory is primarily 
concerned with efficiency from the perspective of shareholders, who invest resources and seek maximum 
return on their investment.   
Meanwhile, studies in organization theory and strategic management suggest a number of 
alternative views about the nature of corporate governance.  Stewardship theory has relaxed some of the 
assumptions about managerial behavior found in agency theory, arguing that managers may act as 
stewards for the good of the organization in situations where only relatively minor conflicts of interests 
exist (Davis 2005; Deutsch 2005).  Likewise, stakeholder theory recognizes that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance practices depends on a wider set of firm-related actors and their interactions 
(Freeman 1984).  Stakeholder theory shifts attention from efficiency arguments (e.g. narrow definitions of 
performance) toward a broader understanding of effectiveness in goal attainment in relation to the 
multiple objectives of different constituent firm stakeholders (Connolly et al. 1980).  Yet, it has not 
developed a comprehensive and systematic framework which captures the interactions of different 
stakeholders with the environment or with each other.  
Despite their differences, a common tendency within these research streams is their reliance on 
similar ‘closed systems’ logic to posit universalistic models of efficiency, which abstract away from 
important environmental complexities.  In agency theory, the ‘under-contextualized’ approach remains 
restricted to mostly two actors (shareholders and managers) with little attention to how agency problems 
may vary across diverse task and resource environments, the life-cycle of organizations, or different 
institutional environments. Although Williamson (1991a: Williamson 1991b) suggests that transaction 
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costs may be different in different institutional and organizational contexts, he suggests that mainstream 
corporate governance research is “too preoccupied with issues of allocative efficiency … to the neglect of 
organizational efficiency in which discrete structural alternatives were brought under scrutiny” 
(Williamson 1991a, p.277).  Stewardship and stakeholder theory remove some restrictive assumptions of 
the agency approach, yet do not provide a comprehensive research framework that links corporate 
governance with the broader context of different organizational environments.  Rather, most corporate 
governance research continues to view organizational outcomes in a ‘context free’ or universal manner, 
rather than based on how different organizational environments mediate hypothesized relationships 
between sets of corporate governance practices and organizational outcomes, such as effectiveness, 
efficiency, or performance (Ketchen et al. 1997).  However, Jensen and Warner (1988, p.21) suggest in an 
article widely cited in financial economics that, “ownership, voting structure, capital structure, and 
managerial discretion interact with internal organizational forces and affect corporate behavior in 
important ways”. They conclude that further study of these issues by scholars from other disciplines may 
bring exciting contributions to the development of a science of organizations. 
Empirical corporate governance research has begun to cast doubt on whether there is a direct and 
universal link between governance practices and firm efficiency. Many have begun to question whether 
this association holds across the multiple variants of agency conflicts (Van den Berghe et al. 2002), 
different organizational contingencies (e.g. entrepreneurial ventures, initial public offerings (IPOs), or 
mature firms), and in different national settings (Whitley 1999; Crouch 2005; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; 
Kogut and Ragin 2006).  For example, a large empirical literature has sought to predict the drivers of firm 
performance, having  various main precursors—either board independence and size (Dalton et al. 1998), 
dual leadership  arrangements (Beatty and Zajac 1994; Boyd 1994; Ocasio 1994; Dalton et al. 1998), 
executive pay (Bebchuk and Fried 2004), or ownership structure (Hoskisson et al. 2002).  Yet empirical 
analyses have often failed to report any consistent effects, as in the case of board composition (for 
example, see Daily et al. 2003).  This ambiguity is found in many areas of the corporate governance 
literature (Filatotchev et al. 2007).   
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Perhaps more important is the fact that the performance impact of corporate governance practices 
appears to differ with respect to the organizational contexts.  For example, the impact of the market for 
corporate control has been shown to be different for different stakeholder groups.  Takeovers create value 
for target firm shareholders (Datta et al. 1992; King et al. 2004), but are detrimental for acquiring firm 
shareholders or stakeholders such as employees (see Shleifer and Summers 1988; Conyon et al. 2001).  
Different aspects of the organization and its environment may also impact the role of governance 
practices, such as shifts in the role of the corporate board over the life cycle of companies (Hillman and 
Dalziel 2003; Lynall et al. 2003).  Empirical results also show the opposite effects in different countries 
or even in the same country in different time periods.  For example, studies of executive pay show strong 
correlations between pay and performance in the UK (Kubo 2001), whereas executive pay in Japan does 
not have incentive effects, so increasing the sensitivity of pay and performance has no impact on stock 
market performance (Kubo 2005).  Similarly, whereas many studies reported a positive effect of 
monitoring by Japanese main banks on firm performance in the 1970s and 1980s (see Hoshi 1994), a 
decline in lending rates and changes in the macroeconomic climate have led to a strong negative 
relationship during the 1990s (Miyajima 2007).   
We propose that corporate governance research should adopt a more ‘open-system’ approach, 
which draws more robustly upon existing literature in organizational sociology (Thompson 1967; Scott 
2003).  Open systems approaches treat organizational features as being interdependent with the diversity, 
fluctuations, and uncertainties of their environment, and reject universalistic ‘context-free’ propositions.  
The effectiveness of corporate governance practices will depend on threats and opportunities within a 
particular organizational environment, and how stakeholders strategically choose corporate governance 
practices in dialogue with it (Child 1997).  An advantage of this approach is its ability to capture how 
organizations buffer, level, adapt to, or ration these interdependencies with their environments in ways 
that influence core characteristics and behavior of the organization.  Interdependencies have also been 
underlined by work related to organizational structure (Blau and Schoenherr 1971) and strategy (see 
Hambrick 1984), as well as in resource dependency theory (Pfefffer and Salancik 1978) and comparative 
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institutional analysis (Aoki 2001; Crouch 2005).  In short, open-systems approaches emphasize the 
importance of examining corporate governance practices within a holistic context, rather than as single 
factors acting in isolation. 
A further advantage of an open systems perspective is in understanding how environmental 
factors shape the costs, contingencies, and complementarities, and in turn organizational outcomes, such 
as governance effectiveness.  In line with organizational sociology, we view corporate governance 
practices as being effective within the context of different stakeholder constellations, their goals, values 
and resources, and specific organizational environments.  While this concept of effectiveness goes beyond 
particular measures of financial performance, we suggest that the ‘open systems’ approach may be useful 
in studying the impact of corporate governance on a wide range of organizational outcomes that may 
range from a narrowly defined financial performance (e.g. return on assets, book-to-market ratio etc) to 
broader economic and social indicators (e.g. innovation, sustainability, and employee satisfaction).  But 
studying effectiveness in an open systems context suggests the need to appreciate that corporate 
governance may take on different functions across different contexts and that the relative salience of these 
functions may shift as the firm develops.  For example, innovation and growth may constitute 
performance goals at earlier stages of the enterprise, whereas broader stakeholder involvement may be 
more important at its maturity stage.  For the purposes of this paper, we have identified several specific 
economic dimensions of effectiveness used widely in organization studies, which include the more 
traditional functions of wealth protection and the distribution of wealth among the firm’s stakeholders, as 
well as wealth creating aspects of corporate governance (O'Sullivan 2000).  The wealth-creation function 
of corporate governance is often associated with encouraging entrepreneurial leadership and innovation 
even in large, mature organizations (Filatotchev and Wright 2005; Talaulicar et al. 2005).  Although this 
function should ultimately lead to superior performance and growth, its effects on organizational 
outcomes are facilitated by entrepreneurial acts and innovation rather than by reduction in agency costs.   
The ‘open systems’ approach is particularly suggestive for corporate governance research 
because governance itself plays a crucial role in mediating between more open institutional dimensions of 
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the environment and the more closed internal aspects of the firm.  Despite strong development of more 
contextualized or environment-centered approaches in other areas of organization theory, similar 
contextual or environmental factors have largely been ignored within corporate governance research.3  In 
the following section, we develop our conceptual framework which is grounded in organizational theory 
and synthesizes various empirical findings through a relatively parsimonious set of constructs. 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERANANCE 
We propose an organizational approach to corporate governance that draws on three specific constructs 
for understanding the interdependence between governance practices and the organizational environment 
in which these practices are conducted.  These specific constructs are costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities.  In short, we claim that the combination of certain corporate governance practices will 
lead to greater or lesser governance effectiveness depending on the costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities associated with different environments as illustrated in Figure 1.  An important caveat 
is that our aim is not to construct typologies of different sorts of environments, such as technical, 
managerial, and institutional.  Nor do we systematically map the differing dimensions within particular 
sorts of environments, such as the cross-national diversity of governance institutions or industry 
comparisons.  Rather, our focus is on how, once various environments are identified, these may impact 
the different arrangements of corporate governance practices and ultimately measurable aspects of 
governance effectiveness.  We discuss each of these constructs in turn.  
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
Costs 
The potential benefit of various governance practices is at the core of corporate governance research.  
Most approaches posit that improved company performance results from minimizing agency costs or 
maximizing the firm’s resource base.  In addition, we consider governance in the context of potential cost 
implications related to the inputs of corporate governance.  These often appear as ‘externalities’ or 
                                                 
3
 One notable exception in economics concerns work linking corporate governance to diverse organizational 
architectures, where information is bundled and shared in different ways depending on interdependencies among 
tasks and with external environments (Aoki, 2001).   
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unintended consequences that stem from or are manifest in the broader environment of the organization, 
and reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance.  However, such costs will vary across firms to the 
extent that they operate in different sorts of environments.  In this regard, cost-benefit analyses are rarely 
universally applicable to all organizations. 
The implementation of different corporate governance practices may have associated costs of 
several types, starting with the systemic costs of compliance that are reflected in the firm’s balance sheet 
and other accounting documentation (e.g. the audit costs or directors’ insurance).  In addition, corporate 
governance imposes less explicit opportunity costs (e.g. directors’ time spent on governance issues 
instead of business strategy or changes in managerial risk preferences), proprietary costs (e.g. costs of 
disclosure of strategic information), and reputational costs (e.g. costs of fraud, misconduct, or corporate 
irresponsibility).  These various costs may have different effects upon the multiple parameters of 
governance effectiveness, implying potential trade-offs between them.  
Systemic costs of corporate governance are related to the out-of-pocket expenses associated with 
routine compliance with governance rules and regulations.  More specifically, these costs include 
expenditures on recruitment and remuneration of executive and independent directors and costs of 
operating control and risk-management systems, including board committees.  Notably, these systemic 
costs differ according to different sectoral and national regulatory environments.  For example, Aguilera 
(2005) suggests that US accounting firms are increasingly concerned with being sued, and have 
developed a voluntary ‘enhanced audit’ which costs companies more than traditional audit services.  In 
addition, new corporate governance rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act raise litigation risks and result in 
associated increases in the firm’s expenditures on directors’ insurance and indemnity policies (Zhang 
2005).  An important implication is the differential impact of systemic costs on firms depending on their 
resource capacities.  For example, large firms with sufficient resources can more easily buffer these 
systemic costs, while smaller firms with greater resource constraints may be unable to comply and 
consequently face disproportional additional costs if forced to de-list from the stock exchange.  The 
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phenomenon of delisting due to higher compliance costs is also more likely among foreign firms, since 
listing requires greater adaptation to US standards (Aguilera, 2005).   
Beyond these direct systemic costs, corporate governance also entails less explicit and more 
indirect opportunity costs, which are often difficult to quantify.  These costs relate to how governance 
impacts strategic priorities and consequently the exploitation of business opportunities.  For example, 
managing relationships with institutional investors can cause opportunity costs, by diverting managers’ 
attention from strategic and operating decisions associated with running the firm, toward anticipating 
short-term expectations about share prices.  Therefore, opportunity costs may particularly affect the 
effectiveness of governance in terms of wealth creation.  However, this depends on the specific nature and 
composition of investors who have different expectations regarding company behavior.  In addition, 
litigation risks may change management’s risk-taking behavior, and, in turn, this will likely impede firm 
growth.  For example, the benefits of improving legal protection for shareholders, such as through greater 
disclosure, auditing, and control, may be offset by over-regulating the corporate governance environment 
in ways that detract from flexibility and risk-taking (Walsh and Seward 1990), again diminishing the 
effectiveness of entrepreneurial leadership. 
A number of studies have found that corporate governance may have a high cost impact on the 
firm’s proprietary information through requirements of information disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 
2000; Healy and Palepu 2001).  In market environments where competitive advantage depends on 
proprietary technology or timing of market entry, managers may face high costs to the extent that they are 
required to disclose information relevant to their trade secrets or other proprietary information about the 
firm's R&D in progress, innovations, or recent discoveries (Verrecchia 1983).  Moreover, where parties 
face high legal liability for public statements, the extent or content of disclosure may be rationed to offset 
costs resulting from potential litigation (Beatty and Welch 1996). 
Finally, corporate governance influences costs related to the reputation of the firm (Rao 1994; 
Rindova et al. 2005; Washington and Zajac 2005; Rhee and Haunschild 2006)  During the heyday of 
American welfare capitalism, large US corporations built strong reputations and trust with their 
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employees based on strong managerial control (Jacoby 2005).  However, trust was often irrevocably 
undermined through the wave of hostile takeovers during the 1980s, which often benefited shareholders 
but undermined managers reputations and ability to make credible commitments to employees or other 
stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers 1988).  Some companies may be more vulnerable to reputation costs, 
such as auditing firms or food companies, than firms that are traditionally less reliant on reputational 
capital, such as steel or chemical firms.  Companies may try to level reputational costs by adhering to 
voluntary standards developed to assure legitimacy within the industry sector (Bansal and Roth 2000), or 
national corporate governance codes based on ‘comply-or-explain’ principles (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra 2004; Werder et al. 2005).   
 Costs therefore have a mediating impact on the effectiveness of various corporate governance 
practices as illustrated in Figure 1.  The important point is that the degree of direct, opportunity, 
propriertry, or reputational costs associated with a particular governance practice will impact different 
aspects of effectiveness and their salience will vary across different organizational environments.  For 
example, recent work on Silicon Valley firms shows that reputation-based governance mechanisms are 
likely to be more effective in environments characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Podolny 2001).  
However, if firms are unable to level or buffer against particular types of costs within their environment, 
the costs of a particular governance practice may exceed the expected benefits.  As will be discussed next 
with regard to contingencies, the salience of these different costs may be contingent upon the critical 
resources of the firm. 
Contingencies 
Contingency theory examines how the effect of organizational (“structural”) characteristics on 
effectiveness or performance may be mediated or influenced by third variables, such as task uncertainty, 
task interdependence or size (Donaldson 2001).  Although corporate governance might be considered as a 
structural characteristic within this framework, contingency theory has not been elaborated with regard to 
the effectiveness of corporate governance. Here we build on this research and examine how the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practice may be mediated by a different but important category of 
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contingencies, namely the resources and capabilities that shape firms’ interdependences with different 
organizational environments (see O'Sullivan 2000).  As such, we examine how corporate governance 
operates within the parameters of the organization, its internal and external resources, and strategy. 
One aspect of resource-related contingencies is grounded in the resource-based view of the firm 
which takes into account its internal capabilities, such as skills, knowledge, and information (Barney 1991; 
Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Peteraf 1993).  For example, corporate governance may play an important role 
in internal coordination and the motivation of critical employees, depending on the nature of the skills and 
knowledge that are critical for a firms’ competitive advantage.  Much literature in strategy has stressed the 
role of tacit knowledge (Penrose 1959; Grant 1996) or information (Itami and Roehl 1987) in influencing 
competitive advantage.  However, newer literature argues that corporate governance practices are likely 
to shape firms’ internal capabilities and routines.  For example, Zahra and Filatotchev (2004) show that 
corporate governance in a knowledge-intensive entrepreneurial firm can be used strategically, as a means 
to develop and supplement the existing knowledge and experience of the original entrepreneurs by 
acquiring and exploiting externally generated knowledge and experience.  Likewise, the degree and 
nature of firm-specific skills determine the demands on corporate governance for stakeholder 
participation.  Aoki (2001) shows that in Japan insider-based corporate governance supports the formation 
of firm-specific skills and cooperative team-based production, which have contributed to firms’ success in 
industries characterized by incremental innovation.    
A further aspect of resource related contingencies comes from the resource dependency theory, 
which suggests that firms will respond to demands made by external actors or organizations upon whose 
resources they are heavily dependent, but also that organizations may seek to buffer against or minimize 
that external dependence (Pfefffer and Salancik 1978).  For example, the degree and nature of external 
finance is likely to influence the demands placed on corporate governance for transparency or 
independence.  Meeks et al. (1995) find different patterns of disclosure contingent on firm size, debt-
equity ratios, country of incorporation, and international listing.  Likewise, smaller and younger firms 
 17 
may have less need of these governance mechanisms to the degree that their operations are more focused 
and easier to monitor through hands-on involvement.   
Contingencies thus imply that the role of corporate governance is likely to differ in ways 
contingent upon both the external and internal resources which are critical within the context of the firms’ 
organizational, market, sectoral, regulatory, or institutional environments.  Since the nature and salience 
of these resources depends on the interplay with diverse organizational environments rather than being a 
universal model, we argue that contingencies associated with internal and external resources are likely to 
influence the effectiveness of particular governance practice.    In other words, the effectiveness of 
governance practices may depend on the firm’s size or age, the phases of growth or decline in the 
company’s development, the character of innovation in different markets and sectors, and the regulatory 
and institutional constraints on business activity (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Deutsch 2005).  While a 
contingency perspective rejects the notion of universal best practices (Donaldson 2001), it also suggests 
that policy will be more effective if it takes into account the potential diversity of governance 
mechanisms, which deal with important contingencies.  In short, a ‘one size fits all’ approach is 
undesirable. 
Empirical research on boards highlights the growing attention to how the effectiveness of various 
corporate governance practices differ based on contingencies.  Recent meta-analysis has found that the 
relationship between firm performance and board size is stronger for smaller, as compared to larger firms 
(Dalton et al. 1999).  Filatotchev and Toms (2003) and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue similarly that 
board diversity and director interlocks may play an important role in crisis situations, since, from a resource-
dependency view, these board structures may generate more diverse networking opportunities to resource 
providers.  Research on IPOs (Certo et al. 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop 2002; Sanders and Boivie 2004) 
also demonstrates that board diversity supports wealth-creating aspects of corporate governance in newly 
listed companies.  On the other hand, Luoma and Goodstein (1998) focus on the board representation of 
stakeholders, including employees, public officials, suppliers, and customers, and discover that such 
representation is more likely when companies are large or are in highly regulated industries. 
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Another salient dimension of contingencies is the fact that the organizational resource base and its 
interdependence with external environments is not static, but an integral part of organizational dynamics.  
The application of a contingency-based concept of corporate governance has been developed within an 
emerging body of research on the life cycle of corporate governance (Johnson 1997; Lynall et al. 2003; 
Filatotchev and Wright 2005).  This literature identifies a number of stages in the development of the firm 
where different ‘bundles’ of corporate governance characteristics are most effective.  Corporate 
governance is viewed as a dynamic system whereby governance practices may address changing sets of 
environmental interdependencies throughout the different stages of the firm’s life cycle, such as start-up, 
growth, maturity, and decline.  Over these stages, firms may evolve from having a very narrow resource 
base to having a more extensive and heterogeneous resource base.  This transition may require at least 
temporary reliance on external resources, creating new corporate governance demands by external 
resource providers to assure that wealth is created on the basis of these firms specific resources and 
distributed fairly in terms of each factor providers, whether these are shareholders or other stakeholders.  
In addition, external financial resource providers might also care that costumers continue to be able to 
rely on the product that they obtain or that employees still have strong firm attachment which is critical 
for firm innovation and sustainable growth.  Likewise, mature firms with more heterogeneous resource 
pools may face a greater range of stakeholder demands for accountability.  As firms evolve over the life 
cycle, we argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance also undergoes shifts in the balance 
between accountability roles vs. resource and entrepreneurial roles, as the nature of their internal 
resources and interdependence on external resources also changes.   
In the early stages of the life cycle, the entrepreneurial firm has a narrow resource base.  It is 
usually owned and controlled by a tightly knit group of founder-managers and/or family investors, and the 
level of managerial accountability to external shareholders tends to be low.  In this context, for example, 
the resource and knowledge contribution of board members may be relatively more important compared 
to monitoring functions that play a key role in more mature firms.  As the firm grows, it will require 
access to external resources and, consequently, the board may be opened to external investors, such as 
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‘business angels’ and venture capital firms.  These board members supply financial resources, but equally 
they provide the technical and industry expertise that broaden the knowledge base of the firm and 
contribute to its entrepreneurial capability.  At the maturity stage, the balance between entrepreneurial and 
accountability roles shifts, since uncertainty about technology and markets diminishes and demand for 
financial resources to grow the business increases (for a discussion of these changes in uncertainty, see 
Podolny 2001).  Consequently, corporate governance may shift towards greater transparency and 
increasing monitoring and control by external providers of resources.  For example, an IPO is likely to 
offer the firm higher legitimacy and enhanced access to financial resources, but it is also accompanied by 
an increased demand for accountability and scrutiny from the investment community and other 
stakeholders.  
The life cycle literature thus suggests that the changes in firms’ resources and capabilities alter 
the interdependence of the firm in a dynamic way, alongside transformations in the organizational and 
industry environment.  Moreover, these changes may impose different demands on corporate governance 
practices.  Therefore, in order to achieve governance effectiveness by fulfilling the interests of different 
stakeholders, corporate governance needs to adapt to different monitoring, resource, and strategy roles 
depending on given contingencies such as the stage of the firm’s life cycle.  In this case, effective 
governance depends on patterned variation over the life-cycle, rather than conforming to a universalistic 
model.  In sum, contingencies underline the ‘open’ nature of organizational interdependence, such that, 
whereas mature firms may be concerned with reducing agency costs, new entrepreneurial firms face 
different challenges in terms of anticipating future technological developments and growth opportunities 
as they try to buffer environmental uncertainties through long-term venture capital investments and 
network links associated with board interlocks (Filatotchev and Bishop 2002).    
Complementarities 
A growing literature has considered corporate governance as a system of interdependent elements by 
exploring how governance practices interact and potentially complement each other as related ‘bundles’. 
The rapidly expanding research on comparative governance systems (e.g., Scmidt and Spindler, 2004) 
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suggests that various governance elements may complement each other in a consistent way to form path-
dependent national systems within broader institutional and cultural context. As such, complementarities 
has emerged as a key concept in comparative work on the diversity of national systems of corporate 
governance (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Schmidt and Spindler 2004).  Just as with the contingencies 
literature discussed above, various governance practices are not seen as being universally applicable.  
Rather than isolated ‘best practices,’ corporate governance practices become effective only in particular 
combinations.  However, this research is mainly concerned with complementarities between financial 
systems, legal institutions and governance models on a national level. We develop this research further by 
focusing on complementarities between governance practices on a firm level notwithstanding national and 
institutional differences.  Complementarities concern such interactions between practices, and how these 
interdependencies align governance to potentially diverse organizational environments.  Although the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends on a ‘fit’ or adaptation to different contingencies 
and costs, as discussed in the previous sections, we treat complementarities here at the level of corporate 
governance practices themselves.4  This perspective suggests mutual enhancement, as when the joint 
presence of two or more practices increases their effectiveness within the boundaries of particular costs 
and contingencies. 
The notion of corporate governance as a system of interrelated elements having strategic or 
institutional complementarities has been proposed within the economics literature (Aoki 1994; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1994; 1995).  Here complementarity is usually defined as situations where the difference in 
utility between two alternative institutions or practices U(x’) - U(x”) increases for all actors in the domain 
X, when z’ rather than z” prevails in domain Z, and vice-versa.  If conditions known as ‘supermodularity’ 
exist, then x’ and z’ (as well as, x” and z”) complement each other and constitute alternative equilibrium 
combinations (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Aoki 2001).  This view suggests interaction effects or 
‘clustering’ of characteristics into particular combinations suggested by work on set theoretic approaches 
                                                 
4
 Generically, the concept of complementarities can be applied to analyze the relation of corporate governance 
practices and particular types of resource contingencies, such as various categories of human assets (Aoki and 
Jackson 2007).  In this section, we limit our discussion of complementarities to corporate governance practices. 
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which have become important in management studies (Fiss forthcoming), comparative sociology of 
organizations (Maurice et al. 1986), and analysis of national business systems (Whitley 1999; Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  An important implication is that effectiveness does not result from a universal ‘one best 
way’, but suggests that particular practices will be effective only in certain combinations.  Furthermore, 
complementary sets of corporate governance practices may be further linked with costs and 
contingencies, as discussed in the previous sections, to understand how different patterns of corporate 
governance may give comparative advantages for different business strategies or industry environments 
(Aoki 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001).   
Rather than focusing on broad institutional features described in the comparative literature, we 
examine complementarities in terms of the combinations of corporate governance practices at the level of 
organizations.  Here we suggest that the simultaneous operation of multiple practices is important in 
limiting managerial opportunism (Walsh and Seward 1990; Rediker and Seth 1995; Hoskisson et al. 
2002).  For example, performance incentives for executives are more effective when complemented 
within high board independence and an effective market for corporate control.  These interdependent 
practices would remain quite ineffective without further complementary practices, such as high 
information disclosure to investors to allow the market to price shares accurately and a rigorous system of 
auditing to assure the quality of that information.  Consequently, information disclosure is 
demonstratively higher in the presence of corporate governance practices such as takeover bids (Brennan 
1999), independent directors (Cheng and Courtenay 2004), and in firms where audit committees are 
independent and have financial expertise (Mangena and Pike 2004).  Taken together, independent 
directors, executive pay incentives, information disclosure and takeovers markets form a key set of 
complementary elements at the core of the Anglo-American system of corporate governance.  Such 
complementarities may also help explain why recent scandals such as Enron led to a systemic crisis in US 
corporate governance, since disruption of one element of the system negatively affected other 
complementary elements of this system so that it failed to work in a reinforcing manner and gradually 
broke down as gatekeepers, such as auditors and even non-executive directors, became increasingly co-
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opted by managers (Coffee Jr. 2003), executive pay decoupled from performance (Bebchuk and Fried 
2004), and the market for corporate control was tamed (Useem 1996).   
Meanwhile, many elements common in Anglo-Saxon corporate governance remain absent in 
other countries.  Where one specific mechanism is absent, others may be present and constitute alternative 
‘systems’ (Schmidt et al. 2002).  Different constellations may provide rather different economic functions 
but result in equally effective outcomes (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996).  For example, in German and 
Japanese corporate governance systems, monitoring has been based on relationship-oriented banks rather 
than an active market for corporate control (Baums 1993; Aoki 1994).  Jensen (1986) also suggests that 
when the market for corporate control is less efficient, the governance by debt holders may play a 
particularly important role in restraining managerial discretion.  The long-term nature of bank-firm 
relationships may also complement a more active role for other stakeholders, such as employees, as 
employees’ investments in firm-specific capital are protected from ‘breaches of trust’ (Aoki 2001).  
Employee voice helps to make managers more accountable internally by more thoroughly justifying and 
negotiating key strategic decisions (Streeck 1992).5   
Among all potential combinations of corporate governance practices, complementarities suggest 
that some combinations will be more effective than others.  However, it must be noted that these 
combinations remain to be systematically theorized, let alone investigated empirically.  For example, the 
complementarities between corporate governance and organizational architecture may depend on third 
sets of institutions, such as the domain of the state and polity (Aoki 2001).  As a result, recent literature 
has found more complex or surprising combinations of corporate governance variables than implied by 
early works that focused on dichotomous comparisons of insider vs. outsider or shareholder vs. 
stakeholder systems.  For example, the introduction of shareholder value practices in stakeholder oriented 
governance contexts suggests a number of surprising interactions, such as coalitions of employees and 
investors to promote greater transparency (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Jackson 2005).  While mapping 
                                                 
5
 The recent experience of Germany suggests that employee representation on the board may have important effects 
on the design of executive stock option plans, leading to adoption of more and qualitatively stricter performance 
conditions than similar US companies (Buck and Shahrim 2005)  
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such combinations is beyond the scope of this paper, the important analytical point here is that the 
effectiveness of particular governance practices cannot be seen in isolation.  In fact, a particular 
governance mechanism, such as the market for corporate control or monitoring by independent board 
members, may have opposite effects in different organizational contexts.  Thus, whereas the market for 
corporate control may help exert discipline in the context of dispersed ownership and high transparency, 
the same may undermine the effective participation of stakeholders.  Analytically, it is also critical to 
examine effectiveness in the context of the goals of different stakeholders.  In particular, corporate 
governance may have potential trade-offs in terms of different aspects of effectiveness and firm 
performance (Crouch et al. 2005).  Strong employee participation may increase agency costs but lower 
transaction costs.  Take-overs may lower agency costs, but increase transaction costs.  Inferences about 
the overall complementarity between particular practices or institutions remain challenging, and we 
cannot tell a priori which dimension will drive overall effectiveness (Jackson 2005).  At the level of 
institutions, corporate governance embodying conflicting principles may also allow for more 
heterogeneous combinations of governance practices and maintaining the requisite variety for future 
adaptation in a population of firms (Stark 2001).   
INTERACTION OF COSTS, CONTINGENCIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES IN 
DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Costs, contingencies, and complementarities do not exist in isolation, but jointly mediate the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and their effectiveness.  Looking at these parameters in 
combination and in how they interact with other organizational environments is particularly important, 
since these three factors may add to, subtract from, or multiply each others’ effects.  Often policy or 
governance practices that raise costs may be beneficial to the extent that they help firms adapt to 
particular contingencies or increase effectiveness by complementing other aspects of corporate 
governance.  Conversely, attempts at saving marginal costs by rationing inputs to governance may 
undermine potential complementarities and render it ineffective.   
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In Table 1, we provide a set of stylized cases that exemplify how costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities may interact in influencing the effectiveness of particular aspects of corporate 
governance.  For the sake of illustration, we have selected three aspects of governance: board 
independence, information disclosure, and employee participation.  In the first two examples, we compare 
two stylized cases that are ‘most similar’ in terms of broader national corporate governance systems (i.e. 
Anglo-Saxon and Latin systems), but show distinct sets of interdependencies at the organizational level in 
terms of costs, contingencies, and complementarities.  In the last example, we compare cases across rather 
different national environments to highlight the presence or absence of complementarities.  To provide an 
initial stylized application of our framework, we operationalize each of these three variables in terms of 
their degree of salience.  Since we cannot analyze all potential costs, contingencies, or complementarities, 
we focus on specific examples related to the extent of the firms’ resource base and the strength of a given 
cost, contingency, or complementarity among stylized governance practices.  Finally, we posit whether 
each constellation will have a positive or negative impact on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
overall.   
--Table 1 near here -- 
Case 1:  Board Independence 
To analyze the potential effectiveness of board independence, we compare the case of a large and mature 
public U.S. Fortune 500 firm with a small U.K. post-IPO venture firm.  We suggest that for the U.S. firm, 
the systemic costs of compliance with requirements of board independence entail large out-of- pocket 
expenses, but these large firms have a high capacity to absorb such costs and receive strong benefits in 
terms of enhanced confidence among investors.  Still, substantial opportunity costs may arise if the 
overall board lacks strategic ‘inside’ knowledge of the firm’s operations or industry environment.  Hence, 
we suggest a medium to high level of costs for this sort of stylized firm.  On the other hand, the U.K. 
venture firm faces high systemic costs by appointing independent directors, which may be hard to bear for 
small companies.  Moreover, independent directors may increase risks of proprietary costs when 
strategically sensitive information is shared with company outsiders.  In this case, the overall cost of 
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board independence is generally high, and it may negatively affect the effectiveness of the wealth-
creating and wealth-protecting roles of independent directors.   
In terms of contingencies, the large U.S. firm may operate in a mature or even declining industry 
context.  Meanwhile, the resource base of the firm is broad and diverse.  The stability of industry 
environment and large size of the firm both generally reduce the overall level of uncertainties facing the 
firm.  Consequently, board independence may contribute to greater accountability to external 
stakeholders, who provide the key resources to the firm (O´Sullivan, 2000).  On the other hand, the IPO 
firm is likely to operate in an emergent or growing industry characterized by greater uncertainty regarding 
technologies and market position.  This smaller and younger firm is also likely to have a narrower 
resource base from which to buffer environmental uncertainty.  In this context, the contribution of board 
directors will largely consist of anticipating environmental change and encouraging entrepreneurial 
decisions aimed at securing survival and long-term growth, whereas the traditional role of promoting 
accountability will be less salient.  In such situations, the boundaries between learning and monitoring 
often become blurred (Sabel 1994), and the board members’ knowledge and strategy roles are relatively 
more important than their monitoring capacity (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002).   
Board independence may display complementarities with other elements of corporate 
governance.  For the mature U.S. firm, board independence is likely to be more effective due to the 
presence of information disclosure, which enhances communication between investors and the board.  
Without this complementary dialogue, outside board members are likely to be less truly independent and 
their effectiveness will diminish.  Likewise, independent boards complement several other typical 
corporate governance practices.  For example, independent directors generally decide on executive pay 
and assure appropriate incentive alignment between executives and shareholder interests.  At a broader 
institutional level, the independence of directors is enhanced by the existence of comparatively strong 
legal protection of shareholder rights.  For the U.K. IPO firm, board independence may be less effective 
due to the lack of similar complementarities with other corporate governance practices.  Venture firms 
tend to have large block shareholding by venture capitalists or entrepreneurs, and so they hold seats on the 
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board and provide a strong monitoring role without the presence of independent ‘outside’ directors.6  
Institutionally, the stock market segment for U.K. entrepreneurial IPOs (e.g. the Alternative Investment 
Market) have relatively less demanding disclosure requirements, which may impair the effectiveness of 
independent directors and their accountability to the generally fewer outside shareholders.  Notably, the 
interdependence of board structure with other corporate governance elements differs here at the 
organizational level despite being part of a similar Anglo-American ‘system’ of corporate governance.   
This illustrative discussion suggests that board independence will have a positive influence on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in the U.S. firm, but a potentially negative influence in the U.K. 
firm.  In the U.S., costs are only moderate, the firm’s resource base is relatively extensive and the boards 
monitoring role is buffered from environmental uncertainty, and complementarities with other corporate 
governance practices are high - all of which align the role of board independence with the broader 
organizational environment.  Meanwhile, the U.K. IPO firm faces higher costs, greater environmental 
uncertainties which disrupt the monitoring role of the independent board members, and fewer 
complementary corporate governance practices.  Taken together, board independence is less well aligned 
to the organizational environment of the UK firm. 
Case 2: Information Disclosure 
To explore the effectiveness of information disclosure as a corporate governance practice, we draw on 
two stylized cases from the Latin model of corporate governance (Rhodes and van Apeldoorn 1997; 
Aguilera 2003; Goyer 2003; Hoskisson et al. 2004; Trento 2005).  In particular, we compare information 
disclosure patterns for a large family-owned and publicly traded Italian firm and a large recently 
privatized French firm.  Both firms are publicly traded because they want to have access to equity capital, 
and their critical difference is the different nature of their blockholder interests.  
Previous studies suggest that family owners may have superior monitoring abilities relative to 
diffused shareholders, especially when family ownership is combined with family control over 
                                                 
6
 An alternative interpretation is that the presence of independent ‘outside’ directors would actually complement this 
corporate governance arrangement in a different way by providing access to external resources, and a further check 
against the domination of large owners.   
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management and the board of the firm (Anderson and Reeb 2004).  Because owners in the current 
generation have the tendency and obligation to preserve wealth for the next generation, family firms often 
possess longer time horizons compared to non-family firms.  Family members, therefore, represent a 
special class of large shareholders that may have a unique incentive structure, a strong voice in the firm, 
and powerful motivation to make longer-term strategic decisions (Becht and Roel 1999; Dhnadirek and 
Tang 2003).  In terms of the costs of information disclosure, the close knit nature of family ownership 
may lead families to resist disclosing information to outside parties such as the government and other 
non-family shareholders, because they do not want to lose strategic control or seek to preserve family 
network-based relationships with suppliers and customers (Khanna and Rivkin 2001).  The majority 
family-owned firm will also encounter high opportunity costs in compiling all the necessary disclosure 
information as they tend to keep majority control even for listed companies and hence continue making 
all key firm strategic decisions (Van den Berghe et al. 2002).  Alternatively, a recently privatized French 
firm will be able to benefit from the privatization process information disclosure spillovers and in that 
regard the systemic costs associated with information disclosure should not be as high when the firm 
becomes public.  In addition, because this large privatized firm will have a broader shareholder base, the 
opportunity costs of disclosing are low as the information process is a core part of raising capital, 
particularly when targeting foreign capital (Goyer 2003), and will contribute to positive reputation in 
terms of governance accountability and transparency.   
Regarding contingencies, both the Italian and the French firm are large and most likely in mature 
or even declining industries characterized by relatively few environmental uncertainties and a broad 
resource base.  They both possess a stable legacy and deep pool of internal resources either provided by 
their family-ownership tradition or by being former state-owned firms which traditionally did not need to 
rely much on outside resources.  Hence, we categorize the contingencies of these two firms as having an 
extensive resource base which will be accompanied with low environmental uncertainty. 
Finally, information disclosure may interact with quite different sets of complementary 
governance practices in these two cases.  In Italy, disclosure is likely to display only weak 
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complementarities with other existing governance practices, since ownership structure is concentrated and 
pyramidal.  Family majority owners thus have power to monitor management effectively without high 
public disclosure requirements, as indicated above, and disclosure may even undermine this effectiveness.  
Likewise, the minority shareholders in Italy acquire shares on a fairly underdeveloped stock market with 
low accountability standards, weak mechanisms to exercise voice, and a minimal presence of active 
shareholders, such as foreign institutional investors, who would claim and benefit from disclosure.  Thus, 
the large family-owned, traded Italian firm will not find that information disclosure as a governance 
practice has high effectiveness in terms of wealth creation, protection, and distribution given the high 
associated costs and low complementarities with other practices.  On the contrary, in the French firm, 
information disclosure exhibits a strong complementarity with other governance practices such as the 
existence of market for professional (i.e. non-family) management, dispersed ownership, and the critical 
presence of foreign institutional investors who rely heavily on information disclosure in order to fulfill 
their governance roles through extensive shareholder engagement with company policy.  State 
blockholders may also require transparency to avoid claims on unfair competition in international 
markets.  In this regard, for the large recently privatized French firm, information disclosure will generate 
high governance effectiveness in terms of wealth creation, protection, and distribution among the 
different shareholders, given the low costs of implementation and the strong complementarity fit with 
other practices.   
Therefore, even when firms have similar resource-related contingencies, information disclosure 
may have different effectiveness as a corporate governance practice depending on the nature of the 
blockholders as well as their interaction with the local environment of the firm. In the Italian example, 
because of the high cost of disclosure and low complementarities with other corporate governance 
practices, information disclosure is likely to have a low effectiveness in terms of the main roles of 
corporate governance, such as wealth protection for family owners and other aspects of the longer-term 
wealth generation that may be related to their stable control.  In the French firm, information disclosure is 
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likely to have high effectiveness because the costs of disclosure are low, and this practice is reinforced by 
other existing practices. 
Case 3: Insider Control 
Finally, we compare two stylized cases of employee or insider control in post-privatization Russia (Buck 
et al. 2000) and in Japan (Aoki 1988) to explore the effectiveness of employee participation as a corporate 
governance practice.  In particular, our stylized examples concern large automobile companies that are 
integral to the economic development of these two countries.  Insider control emerged in the Russian firm 
as a result of mass privatization, which has been designed to transfer state ownership to private investors 
and promote the development of Anglo-Saxon governance based on active capital markets.  Instead, it 
resulted in employees and managers receiving large ownership stakes that guarantee absolute insider 
control, with outside minority investors being effectively excluded from participation in strategy 
decisions (Buck et al. 2000).  Employee share ownership is also very common in Japan, although the size 
of stakes is smaller.  Shares were given to employees in the wake of post-war efforts to ban ownership by 
zaibatsu families and lessen the concentration of economic power, but they quickly began to sell these 
shares and this led banks to intervene to stabilize the market (Jackson 2001; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005).  
In Japan, however, insider control was built through a system of cross-shareholdings among group 
companies and financial institutions, where managers of one firm control stakes in other firms.   
Regarding costs, both companies exhibit similar patterns.  Systemic costs of insider control are 
shifted largely to minority shareholders, who have weak legal rights and little capacity to exert influence 
on the company given that a stable majority of shares are controlled by insiders.  Opportunity costs, 
however, may be relatively high due to the strong commitment of resources to employee welfare and 
provision of stable employment.  Therefore, we assume that costs of employee and insider forms of 
ownership range from low to moderate. 
In terms of contingencies, the automobile industry is dominated by large, mature firms with an 
extensive resources base and which operate within established markets.  However, Russian firms are often 
faced with strong legacies of central planning and need substantial modernization and restructuring.  In 
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addition, firm resources may be extensive and suggest high dependency on external resources, but 
business strategy in automobiles is dominated by incremental innovation and quality-based product 
competition that also demands very strong internal capabilities and long-term orientation (Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  In both organizational contexts, therefore, the wealth-creating functions of corporate 
governance are very important, although with the Russian firm having a particularly strong need in terms 
of entrepreneurial transformation.  Here, stable commitments to employees may be critical to assuring 
smooth coordination of production,  involving workers in raising quality, and reducing transaction costs 
(Streeck 1987).  A large literature on Japanese production methods suggests that employee participation is 
a key governance factor in mobilizing the commitment and cooperation of shop floor workers engaged in 
lean production (Sako 1992).  Given the importance of buffering and adjusting to environmental 
uncertainties related to complex, modular production and smooth central resource inputs, strong insider 
control is a potentially effective corporate governance arrangement.   
 Despite these similarities in terms of costs and contingencies, the effectiveness of insider control 
is influenced by strikingly different sets of complementary institutions in Russia and Japan.  In Russia, 
insider control lacks any ultimate checks and balances, since employees usually place their shares in 
manager-controlled trusts.  They can only sell their shares on a restricted basis, and outside shareholders 
have only limited possibilities to exert control over managerial discretion.  Furthermore, state credit 
guarantees have led to substantial soft-budgeting problems, and lenders are not generally involved in 
corporate governance.  Facing unchecked insider control, external investors are generally reluctant to 
provide much needed finance for restructuring and modernization, and, as a result, the effectiveness of 
employee ownership as a corporate governance practice is low.  
In Japan, insider control is constructed within a context of other complementary governance 
practices.  First, while employees and insiders maintain control under normal circumstances, the Japanese 
main bank plays an important role of contingent governance, whereby it may intervene when the business 
situation deteriorates and the viability of the enterprise in threatened (Aoki and Patrick 1994).  Second, 
employee voice is not based solely on ownership, but linked with enterprise-based unions, long-term 
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employment guarantees, seniority wages, and internal training and job rotation to assure the flexibility 
and commitment of this stable labor force (Jeong and Aguilera, forthcoming; Dore 1996).  Thus, insider 
control in Japan remains effective because it is complemented by the shadow of outside intervention by 
the main bank, as well as being internally structured through an independent system of incentives, 
rewards, and participatory practices.  Both of these elements are absent in the Russian case, making 
insider control highly ineffective.   
In sum, our three hypothetical case comparisons highlight a selection range of the different 
interdependencies between costs, contingencies and complementarities.  In the first case, the firms were 
different along thre contextual dimensions (costs, contingencies and complementarities).  In the U.K. IPO 
example, these factors had a compounding and negative impact on the effectiveness of board 
independence, whereas in the U.S. Fortune 500 case high costs were offset by fit with contingencies and 
complementarities with other corporate governance parameters. In the second case, we compared firms 
with similar resource endowments, but facing different costs and complementarities. In the Italian family 
firm example, information disclosure imposed high costs and had negative complementarities with other 
governance practices, such as concentrated ownership.  Meanwhile, information disclosure imposed fewer 
costs on the French privatization case, since this firm faces fewer opportunity costs and has other 
complementary governance practices in the board and investor engagement.  In the final case, we 
compare firms from Russia and Japan, which are similar in terms of costs and contingencies, but differ in 
terms of the extent of complementarities. Again, we argue that this would create differences in the 
effectiveness of governance practices (e.g., employee participation). Together, these stylized cases 
suggest that even one-dimensional difference in contextual factors still may affect the efficiency of 
governance practice, although we are not able to evaluate differences in effectiveness further here in a 
quantitative sense for reasons outlined above. 
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Our framework has highlighted the importance of ‘contextual factors’ based on different organizational 
environments.  Much corporate governance research is limited to rather homogeneous contexts, the 
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results of which may be hard to generalize across different samples of firms or national systems.  In 
addition, the vast majority of previous studies are focused on particular governance practices, without 
taking into account potential interdependencies and/or costs involved.  We suggest that these should not 
be treated, in theoretical or methodological terms, simply as ‘control variables’ in understanding 
otherwise universal relationships.  We further argue that theory and empirical research should progress to 
a more context-dependent understanding of corporate governance and that this, in turn, will prove very 
useful for practitioners and policy makers interested in ‘applying’ corporate governance in particular 
situations.  In theoretical terms, more attention must be paid to the diversity of empirical results and these 
differences must be more explicitly built into theoretical models.  In empirical terms, recent 
methodological advances may help operationalize and test more complex and context-depending theories 
in ways that are hard to do in large-scale sample-based research, which often relies on very broad proxies 
for context factors.  For example, comparisons and case analysis based on set-theoretic methods can be a 
very fruitful avenue for further research.  A potentially more contentious argument is that understanding 
effectiveness requires greater sensitivity to how corporate governance affects different aspects of 
effectiveness for different stakeholders and in different contexts.  For example, whereas return on equity 
may be relevant for the governance of mature firms, younger entrepreneurial firms’ performance may be 
better measured by innovation and growth.  A balance between different functions of governance may 
also change when the firm evolves from its entrepreneurial stage through an IPO to growth and maturity 
stages.  Likewise, corporate governance is likely to be associated with different distributive outcomes 
among corporate stakeholders, which reflect how risks and rewards to their relative resource contributions 
are governance. 
The argument above for a more contextualized approach to corporate governance has 
implications for public policy.  In the light of corporate governance scandals and perceived advantages in 
reforming governance systems, debates have emerged over the appropriateness of different policy 
approaches based on hard law or regulation that draws upon soft law, such as codes based around comply- 
or-explain principles.  The hard law approach to regulation, such as US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, seeks to 
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strengthen corporate governance through legal rules that cover all companies operating in a particular 
jurisdiction.  Such an approach mandates high minimum standards and failure to meet these results in 
severe legal penalties.  Soft law, such as the U.K. Combined Code, is based on an alternative approach of 
comply-or-explain principles.  This approach has been criticized for its weaker degree of enforcement and 
inability to mandate uniform minimum standards, but also has potential benefits in dealing with costs, 
contingencies, and complementarities.  Namely, the flexibility for firms to adapt or mix various corporate 
governance practices under soft-law may help them to tailor corporate governance to diverse 
organizational environments.  For example, Arcot and Bruno (2006) find that giving good quality 
explanations for non-compliance with the U.K. code is associated with higher corporate performance than 
‘box ticking’ compliance.   
The jury is still out on the two approaches.  However, we suggest that the trade-offs involved can 
be better understood by analyzing the implementation of policy in terms of costs, contingencies, and 
complementarities.  For example, Sarbanes-Oxley has been criticized as being too rigid and imposing 
excessively high costs, whereas the U.K. codes have needed to be strengthened by greater legislative 
underpinnings to assure enforcement.  However, the fact that the U.K. approach is arguably the less 
universalistic and more contextualized may also help explain why, as other countries look to the U.S. and 
U.K. as early pioneers in the field, they have adopted some aspects of the U.S. approach, but on the whole 
have tended more to follow the U.K. Codes approach (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  This may 
also be evidenced in the present tendency for a growing number of firms to prefer listing in London rather 
than in New York. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has developed a critique of corporate governance research, especially within principal-agent 
theory, but also within the stakeholder traditions, based on its lack of systematic attention to ‘contextual’ 
factors grounded in diverse organizational environments.  While the ‘open systems’ approach to 
understanding organizations and their environments has been a staple of organization theory, similar lines 
of inquiry remain surprisingly underdeveloped within the corporate governance literature.  We have 
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suggested a framework for looking at environmental interdependencies of corporate governance in terms 
of costs, contingencies, and complementarities related to various well-known practices of corporate 
governance.  In order to take systematic account of these factors in future empirical research, studies of 
corporate governance must explore the patterned variation of corporate governance practices, their 
combinations, and their effectiveness in terms of alignment of organizations with a more contextualized 
view of organizational environments. 
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TABLE 1   





Board Independence Information Disclosure Insider Control 
 Stylized Case 
 


































































High Low  Low  High  Low High 
*  To exemplify contingencies, each cell scores the nature of firm resources in terms of being narrow or extensive.   
**  To exemplify complementarities, each represents the strength of complementarities between the corporate governance mechanism in each 
column with other mechanisms of corporate governance typically found in each stylized context. 
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(e.g. wealth creation, 
protection,  and 
distribution) 
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